Share

[Because of the extraordinary response to Maj. Jim Gant's paper, One Tribe At A Time, I've decided to leave it up all week in the "Number One Slot."  My ongoing interview with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai will pick again next Friday; the Chief has been in Kabul all week, meeting with U.S. and British commanders, and we haven't had time to speak. So all's well that ends well!]

The downloadable and open-able .pdf of One Tribe is here, on the right. On a personal note, let me say again that I consider it a privilege to offer this document in full, not only because of my great respect for Maj. Jim Gant, who has lived and breathed this Tribal Engagement idea for years, but for the piece itself and for the influence it is already having within the U.S. military and policymaking community.

One Tribe At A Time (84) Major Jim Gant’s “One Tribe At A Time” to your computer

One Tribe At A Time is by no means a super-pro Beltway think tank piece. What it is, in my opinion, is an idea whose time has come, put forward by an officer who has lived it in the field with his Special Forces team members–and proved it can be done. And an officer, by the way, who is ready this instant to climb aboard a helicopter to go back to Afghanistan and do it again.

Questions and comments

At the moment, Maj. Gant is at Fort Polk, Louisiana, getting ready to deploy to Iraq, where he will lead an Iraqi commando battalion. He’ll be available in the meantime, however (depending of course upon time demands), to answer questions or take criticisms. Just respond in the comments section below. And I myself have further thoughts I’d like to offer on this subject in the coming weeks.

Here’s a quick one:

The most common response I anticipate to the Tribal Engagement concept (and it’s a valid criticism, shared by Maj. Gant) will go something like this: “Yeah, this is a great idea–but where are we going to find the men to implement it?”

Men for the job

Tribal Engagement Team members, should this concept be adopted, would be called upon to commit for multiple tours under the loneliest, harshest and most hazardous conditions imaginable. To succeed with the tribe they are assigned to, they would have to demonstrate impeccable combat credentials and, even rarer, possess the “people skills” to establish and maintain rapport across a cultural chasm—Western to Tribal Afghan—that has defeated every outside entity from Alexander the Great to the British and the Soviets. The task would be extraordinarily difficult, dirty and dangerous, and in the end would almost certainly be rewarded neither by career advancement (because the enterprise would be unprecedented and outside the normal channels of military promotion) nor by recognition from the public at large, who in all probability will rarely hear of it and wouldn’t understand or appreciate it if they did.

How can we identify and attract such men?

Do you remember this tiny, three-line ad from the London Times, December 29, 1913?

Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honour and recognition in case of success.

5000 volunteers queued up in response to this advertisement, posted by Ernest Shackleton seeking crewmen for his Antarctic expedition.

I may be wrong, but I don’t think our young American warriors would respond with any less enthusiasm than their British cousins did a century ago to a similar call. Do you?

Again, many thanks to Maj. Jim Gant for writing One Tribe At A Time, to Printer Bowler for designing and editing the .pdf and to Callie Oettinger for managing the outreach. I’m proud to put this document in circulation with as much reach as this modest blog can offer. We all hope it proves of interest and of use.

Share

The US/CIA experience in Vietnam should give us plenty of evidence that there are more advantages to running COIN operations in today’s global war on terror than in conducting conventional warfare option. It is even more evident that if we were to plan and execute a sound ‘pacification’ plan in Iraq or Afghanistan, then there must be some elements of COIN at play to help balance out how we mitigate growing insurgent operations. They are smarter and faster at learning U.S. order of battle so how we fight is not a big secret.

In Vietnam the same problem was encountered by the CIA as the North Vietnamese already had extensive documentation of CIA doctrine in conducting air drops, employing stay-behind units, etc. without the benefit of helping that country make changes from within. Obviously, the CIA was fairly confident it could continue to make drops and lose team after team yet they did not factor in the possibility their teams had been compromised time after time. Maybe sheer dumb luck made some missions successful and still, they were failures for a long-term solution.

First, the CIA did not know the North Vietnamese had been consistently studying its methodology and quickly executing countermeasures and mostly obtained this information from the Chinese. Second, incursions carried out into a closed society must accompany a much more comprehensive plan. Once on the ground, units would have to depend on their limited training and then if they landed close enough to populated areas they were instructed to stay low for short periods of time gathering information. But then there was no plan in how to approach locals other than maybe clerics or family members and that alone always posed a great risk to the team members, thus really not accomplishing much but to get them killed or captured and tried.

There was little consideration for exploiting political and ideological angles within the population; at least just not right away. Eventually this reality would manifest itself fully. The suggestion by the CIA to President Kennedy was to engage the population with these psychological techniques, to create the illusion that there was a nascent revolutionary movement at play within North Vietnam and create the threat from within. This approach would have been a proper complement to paramilitary operations, since that could have been the second stage; to actually carry out clandestine operations, sabotage, and a direct attack on the government machine.

There was some of this work involved in the post-invasion stability operations in Japan and Germany, and these are two success stories that need to be studied more. When the allies moved in looked around and started to guide these countries into a post-war, they already had a plan, the intelligence base to tell them where to begin securing the population (borders) supervising local police and basically keeping track of everything the locals did before a turn-over could take place.

So how do we carry out these incursions and do we conduct part sabotage/assassination (just as the Israelis did) while we conduct aggressive PSYOPS campaigns? Even disinformation and propaganda efforts must carry a purpose and that is to engender in the local population the need to fight for their future. Initially the CIA’s intention was to help the Vietnamese become independent from any foreign intervention in the end and this is the basis for stability operations.

The employment of irregular forces (indigenous) is of great importance because they have a vested interest in not only fighting an insurgency such as Iraq, but also to gradually wean themselves from foreign intervention, which is the main purpose of introducing stability operations (nation-building). This has not always been a well carried out concept, as we seem to engage countries with cultures totally different from ours and often we fail to recognize that those differences will affect the outcome of any conflict and how that culture will survive post-conflict/invasion.

The absence of the rule of law is the first factor that must be either established or maintained if already present in the targeted environment. Efforts of pacification were disrupted constantly by the VCI by threatening those people and agencies working on re-building the country with military attacks. Though the allies were able to fight the VCI successfully and provide protection for these activities imagine any NGO working in the field or that matter civil affairs unit while under fire. The first thing that should be provided to the non-combatant population is security. They either get it from their government with foreign assistance or they fall under the rule of insurgent groups and historically the populations do not well at all. That was a critical development in Algeria where the French government allowed more than one political fringe group to develop and begin conducting counterintelligence operations separate from government support then had to try and control more than one group with civilians at greatest risk who were ultimately main victims of hostilities. The French allowed Algerian populations to be stripped of their identities in order to make counterintelligence efforts more difficult and people were chased away from their homes by all factions so there was no security for them.

The Iraq parallel

We’ve tried this endeavor before and had been successful which I wonder if much thought was given to the application of the principles involved in stability operations in addition to the rule of law is the continuity of governance, this includes social and government services, local services, trash pickup, electrical power, potable water, police, border/population control, etc. The greatest examples are post-invasion Germany and Japan. In both cases military police were deployed to conduct law enforcement operations while there was a controlled environment of the population and local government that enabled social growth and the beginning of rebuilding their infrastructure. This could not be done if hostilities were still a consideration, from either conventional or insurgent forces. In the case of Iraq those elements of security and of continuity of governance were absent, combat forces thrust into the realm of law enforcement duties were lacking in training and experience; the difference between fighting a shooting war and maintaining law and order have had a long-term impact on life here. Reconstruction efforts can easily slow down or stop in the presence of violence, whether from insurgent activity or rampant criminality or a combination of both. This has been the case in Iraq.

The VCI also operated openly in populated areas unlike insurgents in Iraq, who opt for a more covert approach but then in some areas they do make themselves known throughout neighborhoods. Iraq insurgents don’t show the highly organized military organization as did the VCI in that the Iraqis did not form a shadow government to run counter to the local government but then there was none to speak of for a while so I guess the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) at first tried to establish a fresh government once Saddam’s regime elements were removed causing a chaotic situation which grew out of control.

I wonder, and would like to get some feedback on this, if some of you who have worked in this field directly could clarify how coalition forces could have gained more ground here by utilizing a COIN approach after the invasion and early enough in the game. Before the mass exodus of government personnel, the sacking of businesses and attacks on police stations and police elements – and I do consider the fact that the potential for those attacks was unfortunately ignored as a possibility – would have been more advantageous because the people of Iraq, though living in authoritarian but controlled environment, would have been more keen on participating in their own liberation afterwards. COIN can easily influence positive or negative political and social change in a country and an effective tool to aid in establishing the stability process.
A combined approach

I don’t want to complain without offering some sort of theoretical plan just as a mental exercise. I could see introducing COIN operations during conventional hostilities to help build an intelligence foundation we could use once things de-escalate enough to begin the stability phase. I’m not saying that using elite units to carry out sabotage missions while others carry out pure SPYOPS within the population could not work. First we would have to link up with the locals and build the necessary networks and we know from experience that native forces and other government structures will have to come into play because the nature of nation building is to return that country to an improved state of peace.

By removing the threat to security in this effort we’re increasing our success rate, of course, this cannot be edged in stone as the nature of warfare is ever changing and not every threat to our operations can be mitigated ahead of time. Perhaps there should be a series of scenarios, preferably worst case scenarios already worked out to aid in the introduction of NGOs as well as a trained and capable constabulary waiting to deploy. Combat troops should have some exposure to law enforcement training but that is not their main purpose and only a civilian constabulary should be in place to assist with these duties.

In essence, had we employed of COIN action before the loss of law and order as it stood before the invasion, the overall environment might have been more accommodating to a continuation of routine life in Iraq while helping them re-build. It’s just a theory but COIN would have been more effective in pushing the Iraqis into wanting their situation to return to some level of normalcy. Just like the Northern Vietnam PSYOPS campaigns, the objective would be to create a real or illusionary revolution or political movement to get the population to be more receptive to change and to reject helping the insurgency. A strong government in place is another necessary element which did not exist in Iraq post-invasion unlike the Vietnamese who had at least strong leadership from the top and was able to rally the people to be part of the fight. This could only be done with the balanced combination of COIN and local support. I think if this is not currently the doctrine to use COIN along with all other military and clandestine resources then that could be the future of warfare; prepare them ahead of time for what’s to come – whatever many outcomes we can devise – unlike current doctrine which to me, appears to mitigate problems as they come up…little or no vision of potential issues.

Sources:
The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq, Celeste Ward, United States Institute of Peace, May 2005, www.usip.org
The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq, Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace, April 2005, www.usip.org
U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, Robert Perito, United States Institute of Peace, August 2007, www.usip.org

Targeting the Taliban
By Michael Fowler

The simplest and safest way to thwart an enemy’s ability to conduct war is to destroy their supply lines. This is an old and useful tactic from the time of King Nebuchadnezzar II (605-562) of Babylon. His armies would surround their hapless victims who had taken refuge in forts, cut off all supplies, including water and food, until famine weakened their army, and then attack. This is a brutal but effective military ploy. We have been in Afghanistan for eight years—and neither the Bush administration nor the Obama administration has effectively utilized this strategy.

The solution to winning the war in Afghanistan is to destroy the Taliban’s ability to make war, causing the decimation of the Taliban war machine. The Taliban’s supply lines are the poppy fields. Eliminating those fields as a source of income would strike a fatal blow to the Taliban.

The Taliban are mafia drug-lords wrapped in Middle-Eastern freedom-fighter apparel. They generate $100 to $150 million annually by imposing “taxes” on opium farmers.Selling and exporting opium raises $700 to $800 million annually for the Taliban. This allows for the purchase of arms for insurgency, terrorism and black-market tyranny. Worldwide, Afghan heroin fuels 93 percent of a $65 billion trade, far surpassing all of Mexico, Southeast Asia and South America combined. The United Nations estimates between 15 to 21 million people use this highly addictive drug. Afghan heroin alone kills over 100,000 people each year, outweighing the U.S. combat losses of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Grenada and Vietnam combined.

Our current policy of agricultural transformation allows the cultivation of opium poppies until economic incentives prompt farmers to take up other crops such as pomegranates and grapes. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009 Annual Report, opium production has doubled under U.S. occupation and is so bountiful that the Taliban has reportedly stored 12,000 tons of opium, which can supply the entire world for three years. We need a new plan.

If the poppy fields in Afghanistan were eradicated, this would annihilate the Taliban’s primary source of funding. This in turn would eliminate their ability to corrupt the Karzi government, buy arms, cause terror, protect al-Qaeda and buy foreign influence. It is the single, clearest solution and would end the havoc in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan while devastating world heroin trafficking in a matter of weeks. This is a win-win strategy.

Proponents against the eradication of Afghanistan’s poppy fields argue that world demand will only increase production in other areas, making poppy destruction a useless endeavor. “If Afghanistan were suddenly wiped out as a producer of opium—by bad weather or a blight or eradication efforts—other parts of the world would simply emerge as new producers,” said Founding Executive Director of the Drug Policy Alliance Ethan Nadelmann. This assumption, while based on the law of supply and demand, ignores the difficulties associated with expanding any type of production from clearing and preparing new land and setting up irrigation. Moreover, counter-drug operations performed in the United States and elsewhere use crop eradication as a means. Focused on the drug factor alone, Mr. Nadelmann misses the larger point: Destroying Afghan’s poppy fields would bankrupt the Taliban, preventing them from resupplying arms and killing Americans.

Others believe increased Taliban recruitment is the primary objection to field destruction. U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates are both on record saying that destroying the poppy fields would strengthen the Taliban and that every disenfranchised farmer would become a Taliban recruit. That may be the case with the devastation of one or two fields, but it will not be the case with total destruction of any and all poppy fields.

A counterargument to this is that when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan almost three decades ago, opium production increased in response to increased arms expenditures. This shows that the economic needs of the insurgent army drive production. Moreover, eight-years of permissiveness have allowed the Taliban to strengthen their forces to an all-time high. In fact, 2009 was the highest loss of life for U.S. and NATO forces. Permitting opium production did not eliminate or curb the Taliban. Another point is that when seasonal cultivation ends, the Taliban gains strengths as most of the opium farmers become fighters and take up arms after the harvest.

One of the fiercest arguments against the destruction of Afghanistan poppy fields is that if opium production is eliminated it will destroy the Afghanistan economy. First, no one makes that argument for Mexican drug-dealers or marijuana cultivators in California. Second, if the crops were removed the Taliban would collapse, Afghanistan would become safe and foreign investment money would flow into that country. More to the point, Afghan farmer’s gross revenues from opium is about $1 billion dollars according to 2007 U.N. estimates, while our 2007 U.S. Military operations cost taxpayers $35 billion. Therefore, the plan should be: burn the fields, crush the Taliban, send the boys home, send one billion in aid and save $34 billion a year.

The U.S. dominates the air in Afghanistan. Poppy fields grow in full sunlight, and forests do not obscure the poppy fields. Eradication efforts will not be hampered by a lack of discovery. Modern herbicides are quite safe and effective, as well as the use of tractors to plow the fields under. When the Afghan farmer is faced with the choice of taking U.S. assistance to grow legal crops or face total eradication of his crops and imprisonment, he will be far more motivated than he currently is to switch his crops.

In the past, the United States did not have the ability to eradicate those fields. Now, we are the occupier of Afghanistan and have the capacity and the duty to destroy this trade. Every poppy that grows empowers the Taliban with more artillery that will be used to kill American soldiers and Marines. No one has more power than Mr. Obama to dispatch the largest source of heroin export in the world. If he really wants get out of Afghanistan and cares about our troops, he must destroy those fields.

-Michael Fowler is the director of Veterans for Academic Freedom, a former Force Recon Marine, instructor of Christian apologetics, author and talk-radio host.

Vietnam, the Media and Lies

by Bill  Laurie

“There were some worthy, honest, and intelligent reporters in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Dickey Chapelle, Robert Shaplen, Liz Trotta, Peter Braestrup, Hugh Mulligan, Keyes Beech, Neil Davis, Denis Warner, were among those who objectively, and without resort to sensationalism, conveyed elements of truth, parts of the puzzle, to the American public. Their efforts notwithstanding, the fog of nonsense spewed out by others obscured and effectively censored honest, logical, comprehensive reporting, denying the American public information needed to develop accurately informed opinions. News media malfeasance was complemented by brilliant manipulative Hanoi propaganda, and a corresponding U.S. government inability or unwillingness to make a case for its own efforts. The American public could not hope to understand what was taking place, and does not today.

No one, least of all South Vietnamese, American, or other allied forces, was oblivious of or happy with the endemic corruption and incompetence, yet, because of flawed and narrowly focused “reporting,” the story of South Vietnam’s progress and improvement remains untold. American reporters never wrote or televised stories about DR, Phan Quang Dan, Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, Gen. Nguyen Khoa Nam, the 81st Biet Kich, the Hau Nghia RF, Col. Mach Van Truong, Gen. Le Minh Dao, Tran Ngoc Chau, Col. Ha Mai Viet, writer Nguyen Manh Con, or RVN Marine Sergeant Van Luom, who stood alone on the Dong Ha Bridge and knocked out the lead tank in an NVA armor column with a shoulder-fired antitank missile, an act, in the words of an American witness, of inspiring “defiance and bravery.”
Knowing little of this, the American public was understandably disenchanted.

The news media seldom, if ever, accompanied American or Australian troops on MEDCAPS or DENTCAPs (Dental Civic Action Projects, extremely welcome to rural people with painful tooth conditions). In the first six months of 1969, more than 200,000 villagers received medical care and 15,000 received dental care from the 3rd U.S. Marine division alone. Instead, the American public was subjected to repeated coverage of the My Lai atrocity, which, like the photo of Gen. Loan, was considered symbolic and representative of the entire war.

Wolfgang Leonhard, a Soviet communist agent before defecting to the West, was tasked with analyzing Western news media stories. He and his colleagues were puzzled over superficial news coverage predominating in the newspapers they read. “Generally, we could only shake our heads over them, and often we were exceedingly disappointed. There was usually not even mention of the really significant events that were causing endless discussions amongst ourselves and on which we were passionately eager to read a serious Western commentary. ‘They don’t seem to know what is going on’ was the main theme of our conversations when we talked to each other on the subject.”

One of the more tragic ironies of Vietnam and the news media failure is that there were many fascinating and positive stories to be told. The American people would have appreciated seeing hour-long specials on, for example, U.S. Marine Corps CAP units, a squad of 14 Marines living in one hamlet for their entire tour, working with and defending “their “ hamlet alongside local PF. USMC CAPs had a higher voluntary extension rate than among their line unit counterparts. Why? It would have made for a good story. It would have been equally enlightening to see programs showing U.S. troops helping an orphanage, or volunteering to teach English. The American public deserved to know about a VNAF Skyraider pilot who had been shot down five times, and continued flying, despite his several fused vertebrae. They deserved to know that American forces could take on the NVA, in their own backyard, and prevail. Something might have been learned from Americans who volunteered for three, four, five, six, or even seven tours as advisors, choosing to serve in Vietnam again and again, not as bloodthirsty and uncaring killers, but as very normal, decent human beings who could eloquently and convincingly explain their motivations, which was ultimately to see Vietnamese people have a life of peace and decent government. Geopolitics and the Cold War, all relatively abstract concepts, were not a primary concern, taking a back seat to basic human concerns for that which is fair.

Americans would have benefited by hearing of Captain Nguyen Quy An, Lt. Vu Tung, and Warrant Officer Nguyen Quang Hien of the famed 219 Kingbees. Were it not for the action of these men, John Litter, Bob Stratliff and Wiley L . Craney, by their own testimony, would have been killed or captured after their helicopter had been shot down in Laos. They were rescued by Captain An and his crew while under fire and surrounded by NVA. Captain An would later lose both his hands by keeping control of a burning helicopter, saving the lives of others on board who would have died had the flame-engulfed chopper fallen from the sky.

Americans were mesmerized by the NVA’s (North Vietnamese Army) 25-day hold on Hue City in 1968, and presumably would be similarly impressed by the 92nd Ranger Battalion 400-day stand at the remote base of Tong Le Chan. Completely cut off, resupplied only by air, the 92nd held, with ambulatory wounded refusing evacuation. Had an NVA unit held out for over 400 days, surrounded and cut off, it would have made headline news. The 92nd Rangers did it and nothing was said.  Had a handful of VC (Viet Cong) high school boys held off an allied attack, it would also would have made headlines. A handful of high school boys did resist VC/NVA forces at the “Truong Tieu Sinh Quan,” a junior high school military academy for sons of RVNAF (South Vietnamese) military fatalities. They resisted to the end in 1975, with twelve- and thirteen-year-old boys sending younger kids home, staying in their barricaded school and fighting on. Many of them were killed and when the Communists came in, they fought them. The Communists could not get into that academy. NVA forces eventually surrounded the school, threatened to level it with rockets, kill everyone inside, and negotiated a surrender. This last stand would presumably have had all the drama and “human interest” for a “big story,” and had VC adolescents been involved opposing RVNAF, the story would undoubtedly have been trumpeted to the American public. To this day, next to nothing has been said or printed, and the cadets at Truong Tieu Sinh Quan are not even a footnote to history.

Coverage of these stories could have gone on and should have gone side-by-side with negative reporting on corruption, civilian casualties, drug use, and other presumed universal evils of American involvement in Southeast Asia. It is neither suggested nor desired that blemishes or morally repugnant aspects be ignored or covered up. It is asserted, however, that it would have been far more honest to have contrasted examples of deplorable behavior with other aspects, not in the least rare, of which many Vietnam veterans are familiar with and participated in. Fairness and objectivity also demand that equal coverage be applied to the VC/NVA shortcomings and ruthless excesses shown in proportion to their existence and occurrence. Had all this been done, the American public would have been able to understand something, and certainly much more than the psuedo-understanding derived from the “shoot-em-up-bang-bang” reporting they were continually exposed to. For any number of reasons, “positive” news did little for a reporter’s career or ego, a career based on finding or inventing “stories” accentuating the negative while heightening public discontent.

Ignorance of military and Southeast Asia matters, of communist revolutionary warfare, fueled by potential for lucrative career advancement, unwilling or unable to report on South Vietnamese or Laotian troops except in cases of failure, apparently enthused by the visual impact of war and the destruction it causes, sometimes disdainful of South Vietnamese if not American troops while ignoring Australian, Korean, Thai, and New Zeland forces, the news media proved incapable of depicting Vietnam, and Hanoi’s War, in its entirety . The American public saw the same “bang-bang” every year, and were misled into assuming nothing had changed, nothing was accomplished. Allied temporary defeats were portrayed as permanent setbacks, while victories and accomplishments went unreported, or were, with smug theatrics, cast aside as government propaganda.

News media misrepresentation not only misled and uninformed the American public, but also prohibited its ability to think and make logical inferences on its own.

In the final analysis, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Hanoi’s war, and American involvement could not be, and cannot be, understood, in good part because of media failings, moral, intellectual, and otherwise. Without recognizing this, and knowing that what was reported was not the all-comprehensive truth of the matter, the subject itself cannot be understood. Overall, and efforts of responsible reporters notwithstanding, the nature and extent of news media failure in Vietnam exceeds that of allied military forces who were attempting to and succeeding, despite documented lies and bumbling, to stop Hanoi’s War. Many people died and millions more have greatly suffered simply because the whole story was never told. And because what was portrayed in media reporting was demonstrably not, to use the famous Cronkite phrase, “the way it is.”  This bitter judgment is itself based on beliefs articulated by Robert Elegant, himself a journalist :

“Illusionary events reported by the press as well as real events within the press corps were more decisive than the clash of arms or the contention of ideologies. For the first time in modern history, the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield but on the printed page, and above all, on the television screen.”

Looking back coolly, I believe it can be said that South Vietnam and American forces actually won the limited military struggle. They virtually crushed the Viet Cong in the South, the “native” guerillas who were directed, reinforced, and equipped from Hanoi, and thereafter they threw back the invasion by regular North Vietnamese divisions. Nonetheless, the war was finally lost to the invaders after the U.S. disengagement because the political pressures built up by the media had made it quite impossible for Washington to maintain even the minimal material and moral support that would have enabled the Saigon regime to continue effective resistance.”  Elegant, a highly acclaimed British reporter on Vietnam, later added these terrible words:

“Never before Vietnam had the collective policy of the media sought by graphic and unremitting distortion, the victory of the enemies of the correspondents own side.”

Could this possibly be the truth about the performance of the U.S. media in Vietnam? In ending this series, from my extended observation and study of the media while on the home front during the war, this is certainly the way it looked to me. And many others. Said Senator Margaret Chase Smith, “The press has become more sympathetic to the enemy than to our own national interest.” (Congressional Record, June 16, 1971)

—Bill  Laurie -Vietnam War historian

Strategic failures of the Soviet war in Afghanistan: Soviet perspective and the political option

By: M. E. Leclerc

As the first Soviet units deployed into Afghanistan on December 27 1979 the world waited to see how once more the emerging superpower conduct another operation, further cementing its grip in the region, including and continuing on the path to expansion of its republics. The belief that Soviet military superiority would prevail in this theatre of operations was shared by the Soviets themselves, and for good reason. After conducting effective campaigns in the Ukraine (1945-1951), East Germany (1953), Hungary (1958), Czechoslovakia (1968) and occasionally exercising military pressure in Poland the Soviet Union felt confident that their methodology would be equally successful. Their rapid, brutal incursions, the elimination and replacement of local governments with a pre-assembled facsimile had been tested and considered the standard.

This standard had been so successful that to the elite members of the Politburo – perhaps under pressure to squelch the fast advancing revolt against Communist rule in Afghanistan – the decision to send troops into the region was justified and the end game a self-fulfilling prophecy. The motivation to regain control over the country and keep it from developing an alliance with the US and Iran was primarily the driving force however, many other conditions factored into the decision. In spite of an aggressive effort by the Central Committee’s insistence that the Soviet Union not be linked in any way with military action and that the thrust be directly attributed to the Afghans. Clearly, the controversial Taraki/Amin government was not only split by its own power struggles and breaking from Soviet control (not refusing Soviet economic aid) but those players exiled from Afghanistan, upon their return, had quickly begun to work against them and adding a complex set of dynamics to the problem.

The offer to send military helicopter maintenance personnel, advisors, propaganda experts, train 50,000 Afghan officers in the Soviet Union and have their training expedited and delivery of wheat at no cost were measures designed to avoid military intervention but at the same time left the door open for that option. The negotiations between Taraki and the Politburo had taken off on an increasingly tense situation for Taraki in that he had lost positive control of his armed forces since defections to the rebel side were numerous and he had few people he could trust. Taraki made a strategic mistake in ridding his cabinet of advisors which was a dual-edged sword.

On the one hand by sending away Soviet personnel on the ground who could report to the Politburo accurate information of what he was up to and second the Soviets should have questioned and possibly stopped this action. The Soviets though knowledgeable that the political situation in Afghanistan was not advancing as desired, allowed Taraki to continue his anti-Soviet campaign. He also failed to illustrate to the Politburo that many an Afghan Army officer had deserted and joined the resistance movement, which meant that Taraki had few supporters in the military.

This would indeed be the catalyst for his frequent requests for Soviet military assistance and though there was some opposition to a military approach, the decision to send troops and to prepare for the operation was approved. Factors involving the potential conflicts Soviet forces could encounter in dealing with the Afghan people, their rejection of foreign customs and governance were known but not taken into account. After a very short delay, the elite issued the order to prepare a contingent of 50,000 troops two weeks before the actual invasion.

After the Taraki removal, Amin had become an even worst liability as the rebellion continued to escalate, making his removal just as imminent with the better-aligned Karmal who waited in the sidelines. Karmal had already begun to show signs of forming the opposition’s movement against the Amin government and Amin’s demise had been made even more on a quest to undermine Soviet influence, he orchestrated rumor campaigns to reach tribal elders assuring them of a hasty Soviet departure, purging government members and placing family and close friends in cabinet positions. The Soviets flooded the country with brigade-strength units in Kabul, the Bagram air base and the airbase at Shendan followed by the delivery of armored vehicles and artillery and a an additional troop surge of 5,000 within 48 hours.

To the outside world the calling of Soviet Army regulars from Hungary and East Germany was originally thought of as a concerted effort to help the Amin government deal with the Mujahideen fighters. However, once Amin and his family were executed and Karmal installed, the tone of the military incursion had changed completely. The impact of deficient political intelligence did not play a larger role in predicting and preventing the situation in Afghanistan from evolving into a full-blown war and would carry through the next ten years.

Soviet Intelligence in the battlefield

The first waves of the invasion were successful in shocking the Afghans back into the Soviet agenda but this success was quickly reversed. The Soviets had conducted the invasion in the same fashion as they had in previous operations in Eastern Europe. Their initial strategic and tactical mistakes during the Hungary campaign opened the door to improved fighting approaches, thus significantly reducing their casualty rates during the Czech offensive. The Soviets had first knowledge of the Afghan road structure since they had built most roads as well as airfields and were well aware of the scope of local politics. Even with the disparities in military capability between Soviet forces and Afghan fighters, they entered into the conflict with a clear objective, but did not realize the depth of their commitment.

The invasion was carried out first by sending Spestnaz elements to storm the presidential palace while regular forces blocked any possible coordinated Afghan counteroffensive (units on the ground moved across the country seizing major cities), and borders shut down. This was accomplished even more readily since Amin’s oppressive rule had forced many defections from the Afghan forces which Taraki had begged the Soviets to augment with Soviet forces earlier in the year. This meant that there would be a reduction of native forces that could assist in the operation. Massive air support, artillery and mechanized units ensured that any advancing forces would do so unopposed by clearing all possible rebel attacks. The fight was followed by mopping up as they advanced on Mujahideen fighters.

With all this firepower the Soviets believed the Afghans would be obliterated and pose no further threat. An operation designed to go for months ended up in a ten-year war. Simply, the enemy was much more qualified to fight in their own environment and in their traditional fashion. This fighting style afforded the Afghans time to regroup, study Soviet tactics in relative safety and made themselves a harder target to hit by retreating and ceding those areas to the Soviets then returning later on to conduct further attacks. This is a tactic that has transcended time and technological advancements and it is still practiced today. Conventional wisdom existed within Soviet military units at even the lowest level in the ranks and problems with decreasing morale and discipline spread out fast. Soviet forces trained for combat in a battle space defined by high-technology including nuclear weapons and in a European theatre of operations, not a guerilla war against a technologically undeveloped enemy.

Ground commanders failed to utilize their forces in their best capacity. Reconnaissance troops were used in regular combat, thus wasting intelligence gathering capability and many an insurgent attack on Soviet forces would be the direct result of poor or non-existent OPSEC. Units were frequently attacked my Afghan fighters after their routines being profiled while the Soviet intelligence did not enjoy the same scope of observation. The Soviets, though well-trained, had By contrast, the Mujahideen’s intelligence was frequently in revision and rebel fighters conducted successful sabotage missions as they possessed knowledge of the terrain, exploited local population for information and shelter and maintained Soviet artillery officers became frustrated that their enemy would not remain in strike zones, Once the shock wore off the intensity and determination of the Afghan fighters increased much to the surprise of Soviet forces. For many a Soviet soldier, the reality of combat was one of quick adaptation and hope of survival. Unfortunately Soviet tactics changed very slowly with many units developing a moving bunker mentality where tactical initiative was badly needed, though many of the elite forces fought bravely and were able to adapt to new fighting conditions but this happened in the last three years of the war.

Winning Hearts and Minds

The Afghanistan conflict was possibly one of the most politically and socially traumatic events as the citizens of the Soviet Union quickly discovered that the troops returning from their tours were undisciplined, demoralized and scores more also afflicted with disease. The tone of the war did not match Soviet idealism of previous conflicts in that soldiers were trained to fight anti-Marxist foes and were viewed by the public as heroes. Support of Soviet troops was scarce within Afghanistan and back in the Soviet Union. Soviet forces were drafted then rotated back home, carrying with them the struggles of an increasingly unpopular war. In addition to all of their troubles adapting to normal life in the Soviet Union upon their return from the war ensured that many generations developed psychological, social and economic ruin.

Casualty rates may have been muddled by the Soviets only 6 deaths and wounded resulted from the operation when in reality casualties amounted to close to 7,000 and over 9,000 wounded by 1983. The control of the media reports created a hostile environment for the troops upon their return home and in Afghanistan and further encouraged by an indecisive central government and shifting policies. Winning the trust and cooperation of the Afghan people was even more difficult. Troop levels were insufficient to cover increasing combat roles and field commanders were not keen on extending their security beyond their area of operations which protected 29 provincial centers, industrial and economic installations. The problem with the lack of troops was that it also affected their ability to protect the local population, creating the eventual death, abuse and displacement of scores of Afghan civilians.

Ultimately, the failure rested on a central governing power that restricted not only the oversight of the decision-making process but also the flow of intelligence, the suppression of the indications and warnings that a military option was ill-fated and that the Soviet people would be against it once media coverage was restored. This took place over a decade and several changes in leadership, further compounding the problem. In the meantime, the embattled Soviet forces faced such hardships. This kind of secrecy, rather than secure a victorious outcome, gave way to economic, social and military downfall of the Soviet state, as its citizenry caught on to the failures and difficulties Soviet troops had to endure. To give them some credit, the Soviets made many attempts to control the situation by encouraging political reforms from within Afghanistan long before the military option was put on the table. Their knowledge of a crucial state client, the constraints of religion, political landscape and geography were not sufficient to measure potential problems in securing stability. However that was the end of their insight.

The Soviets had either no idea or chose to deny how the influence of Islam would have on their military and political involvement. Their confidence that Communist principles would work in Afghan society were partly true, had there been a more decisive and consistent policy but even so in the end Afghans would have rejected the attack on their traditions and way of life. The split along ethnic and tribal lines caused little or no local support of Soviet troops even if there were some supporters of a communist regime. That and racial and ethnic rivalries posed an even more serious impediment in the reconciliation of all factions within Afghanistan, a detail completely lost to the Soviets in spite of having first-hand intelligence of the culture.

Sources

Grau, Lester and Nawroz, Mohammed, The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger or War? http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_52.html

Grau, Lester, The Bear went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201996/Bear%20Went%20Over%20Mountain%20-%20Aug%2096/BrOrMn.pdf

Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record.html

The Right of War
By Z. Morad

Is the current war really the biggest mistake of all time? Are the Republicans Fascists? Imperialists? Warmongers? Is the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan really the worst mistake in US history? Although there was a time when Americans generally agreed that their country was a force for good, that time is not now. With such a huge disconnect between knowledge of the war and the average citizen, such beliefs are seductive. After all, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan today don’t adversely affect the average citizen; there is no draft, and no one is buying war bonds or recycling their jewelry. To the majority of the populace the war is largely a spectacle, one that is often discussed by the leftist pundits with a snide quip and casual disregard of seriousness of the situation. What is never put into perspective is the sheer and absolute horror of those that were forced to live under the regime of Saddam Hussein. I guess mass murder is a lot easier to ignore when you get all your news from the Daily Show.

Yet the term ‘war-criminal’ is not one that you will ever hear to describe Saddam; rather it is reserved for the former President and the members of the Armed Forces. Many ultimately question whether the war in Iraq was really just, and the story of the Iraq war is one that is often portrayed as another mercenary exploit in a long history of US imperialism. However, if Fareed Zakaria is to be believed in his Future of Freedom, democracies (including our Republic) never war amongst themselves due to their shared heritage of liberty, but that war between the democratic and non-democratic forms of government are not only likely but inevitable.

A close look the history of warfare, both that of United States and various European powers since their democratization suggest that this is true; democracies loath to fight each other and tend ally against these non-democracies, which are of course inevitably various forms of tyranny. Take for example WW2, a fight that is sometimes referred to the Left as the last “good” (or just) war that United States was involved in. Would the decision to stop Hitler’s warpath have met with success if the same leftist pundits that we have now been around during the 1940’s? The Great War was also a war against a murdering tyrant that resulted in a long and costly occupation, but with fall of the Berlin Wall and the perspective of history, can there be any doubt that the cost was worth it? By applying today’s sophistry to the past, we should conclude that we as a nation had no right to invade Berlin, and that intervention in Europe was simply too long and inconvenient to justify action, consequences be damned. Perhaps FDR would be the one called a “war criminal” while the press quietly ignoring Hitler’s death camps.

It might be said the so called “pacifism” that holds sway with the American public is not so much for peace as it is simply against war: no act of tyranny, oppression, or genocide is enough to justify acts of military intervention, no crime horrific or egregious enough to spur the political Left into action. As John Stuart Mill said,

War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse. The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself.

However, in the Golden Age of “pacifism at any cost”, no such truth can exist and there is no such thing as a Just War. To those that advocate anti-war, an immediate peace is more important than the anarchy and genocide that would ensued as result of the premature withdrawal of a US presence, yet the anti-war crowd insists that they are ultimately moralists. No, instead conflict itself is seen as the great evil, and those with the conviction strong enough to fight against injustice in lands abroad are considered fools, murderers, and pawns; completely deserving of any harm or ill fate that comes their way.

However, the truth is that United States has a history of engaging with foreign powers as civilizing acts of a morally superior foreign policy; we can see clear examples of moral axioms dictating US intervention in the decision to help the Allied forces during WW2, and in the conceptualization of the Monroe Doctrine and Nixon’s policy of Détente. Iraq and as result Afghanistan are no exceptions. Perhaps I am wrong however, and it was presumptuous of the United States to infringe upon Saddam Hussein’s right to torture and gas his own people. Those that believe that the war in Iraq is a moral failing of the United States must ultimately ask themselves the following, “Do tyrannies have a moral right to exist?”

If the answer is no, than how can waging war against a dictatorship be unjust? As the Greek philosopher and military writer Tacitus once said, “A bad peace is worse than war”. In the time of Antiquity it was correctly understood that war was not the greatest of evils, that there are moral principles worth fighting for, and that quietly tolerating despotism and injustice is far worse than the bloodiest of battles. Bare with me for the sake of argument and ignore for the moment the accusations of war profiteering and the confusion over WMD’s; was it really wrong to end the repressive and murderous reign of psychopathic tyrant? With all the spin and political maneuvering, it is easy to ignore the sheer magnitude of Saddam Hussein’s crimes against humanity. Or could it that dictators have an inalienable right to oppress, and the United States really is in the wrong? —ZM

Why Mexico is Important

by ME Leclerc

The U.S. must stay engaged with Mexico in the war on drugs

Mexico’s potential for fragmentation is a serious threat to US national security however, there is a low level of preoccupation that the phenomenon of OTM (Other than Mexicans) persons and the spillover of drug-related violence into the US. The threat of incursion by terrorist groups via the southern border is frequently downplayed in the media, such as the recent series of arrests in Mexico of several individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism have not inspired much of a response for action as would an arrest in the US. Mexico claimed that even though the men arrested are indeed tied to a terrorist group they were not actively identified as being part of a plot. US national security is threatened by this instability even more so as Mexico’s fate hangs on a fine line and has been infective in controlling its own borders.

This is a two-dimensional responsibility; the US has a duty to control human traffic through its borders yet Mexico’s inability to combat the drug cartels has opened the doors to intra-national gangs, smaller pockets of indigenous insurgency movements and also invited groups linked to radical Islam-ism. The problem in dealing with Mexico is that it has been receiving help from the US at a lower level than that of Colombia’s drug war while Mexico struggled to contain its own problems. Basically Mexico has been relegated to a secondary place of relevance even though they are our closest neighbor. This is not to say that preserving Colombia’s side in eradication operations in a consistent manner will not at least slow the flow of drugs out of the country however Mexico holds a more relevant threat to the American way of life.

Stratfor reports of increase violence in Mexico’s Northern provinces (Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Chihuahua) posing a serious threat to individuals and tourism. The US State department has issued a warning for Americans to stay clear of these areas[i]. Kidnapping for ransom and contract killing cases are a huge problem and a source of anger held by Mexicans and recent public demonstrations show that the rampant violence must be dealt with but there are bigger problems ahead. Violence is believed to be almost as high as that of insurgent groups in Iraq and casualty numbers are rising, making Mexico’s national security problems our own. President Felipe Calderon has the right idea to slowly work a pull-out of military units from the troubled provinces and replace with capable police forces however this is a tough job. The only possible way this situation could improve is through comprehensive political reform, the modernization of Mexican police forces and removal of military forces from drug interdiction and law enforcement operations. Removing military troops from the drug war equation will help protect the armed forces from the same corruption found in police agencies but producing capable and a professional police force takes years and much critical time has been wasted. Calderon’s effort to purge the police of over 40,000 officers by conducting comprehensive background checks is commendable however if his new police and military operations do not handle the surge of violence that will have serious political consequences. For one, any new leadership following Calderon’s presidency could either choose to be friendly and receptive to US aid. Another possible outcome would be that Mexico could become more hostile just as Hugo Chavez’s foreign policy keeps the rest of Latin America from accepting that assistance does not mean a potential US invasion or political meddling and violation of their sovereignty.

Plan Mexico

Funding must be offered to rebuild or replace government services or programs and a more expanded law enforcement presence instead of focusing on modernizing the Mexican Army though there is a great need for Mexico to bring up their military standards. The drug war has been fought so that the military, even if it is successful in their interdiction operations, its image will suffer greatly as the public may see the Army as oppressors rather than saviors. At this point it appears the Mexican public just wants the violence to go away however the root of the problem is becoming more obvious to people. Organizational corruption and drug money are great impediments to achieving rule of law. Unlike the US many countries struggle to keep the parts from separating from the whole and are often the source of such violence; spilling across borders. In essence Plan Mexico will help augment police forces as well as military but more emphasis should be placed on continuing the long-term investigation of police personnel to include prosecution and incarceration. Increasing the number of officers on patrol cannot be accomplished quickly enough to contain the violence and illegal drug trafficking activities and restore order.

Policing in Mexico is not parallel to that in the US in spite of optimistic outlook from law enforcement experts. Bratton and Andrews conducted a study of law enforcement methodologies in Latin America which they believed compatible with US methods. It is doubtful that police-to population ratios can be achieved in Latin American countries as would NYC or any other modern US city. Mexican populations – as is the case throughout South America – are distributed in scattered patterns due to their unique topography and vast segments of land that are uninhabited and hard to reach which are prime areas for drug traffickers and armed insurgencies. These are hardly problems encountered in the US where there are more tolerable levels of law and order and policing large populations is a more achievable goal. Their assessment was not completely off the mark in identifying Latin American inability to establish good relations with the public and conduct investigations.

Their suggestion that police departments break down threats by sectors is a good idea consistent with their theory and could be applicable to the Mexican situation but we must bear in mind that the environment is completely different than that of the US and will require military support until these problems are resolved. This is more a social experiment than political reform which will have to continue in order to afford improvements in policing. The funding from Plan Mexico could supplement the State Department’s law enforcement academies already in place, help support background checks on officers and establish a platform for building pride and professionalism in police forces. Promotion boards and salary scales must be implemented to make the job more desirable to officers not just officials. Force protection measures are also an important consideration as many high-level officials are being targeted for assassination and a personnel security program should be established.

Our focus must be strong in keeping Mexico from falling apart so that its internal troubles do not reach the US is many years behind. The time and place for reforms in this sector must be undertaken now as Mexico’s problems are quickly becoming our own.

Sources consulted

Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Country Profile Mexico, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Mexico.pdf

White, Bobby, The Wall Street Journal, Pot Crop Infiltrates Vineyards, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122145024251835201.html?mod=hps_us_inside_today

William Bratton and William Andrews, Driving out The Crime Wave: The police methods that worked in New York City can work in Latin America http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_time-driving_out_crime.htm

Hall, Kevin McClatchy Newspapers online, Mexico’s drug traffickers set their sights on top officials, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/46971.html

Root, Jay, McClatchy Newspapers online, Mexican army can’t stop drug lords’ war on cops, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/36404.html